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On September 29, 1994, President Clinton signed into law the Riegle-Neal Inter-
state Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.' This historic banking legislation
allows the formation of larger banks with extensive interstate branch networks by
eliminating many of the geographic restrictions currently placed on banks. This will
result in a more efficient banking system in the United States which will ultimately
enhance the competitiveness of U.S. banks and companies. President Clinton, in sign-
ing the bill, described it as one component of a comprehensive strategy developed by
his Administration to systematically address the problems of the American economy.2
Two Chief Executive Officers of major banks who spoke at the September signing
ceremony described the legislation as "landmark" and predicted it would help make the
United States a stronger competitor in world markets.' One characterized it as one of
the most significant pieces of banking legislation in our history.4
This article will: (1) trace the development of geographic restrictions on the U.S.
banking system; (2) recount recent Congressional attempts to remove these restrictions;
and, (3) explain the main provisions of the Riegle-Neal bill.
II. THE HISTORY OF GEOGRAPHIC RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. BANKS
American banking has historically been characterized by geographic restric-
tions-both intrastate and interstate. Such restrictions have been based in part on the
fear of excessive concentration of financial power, the desire to promote close relation-
ships between bankers and borrowers, and the aspirations of communities to control
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appreciation for his work on the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.
** Ms. Lasker is a Legislative Assistant with the United States Senate Committee on Banking,
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2. President Bill Clinton Signs Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, FED.





their economic development. As a result of these restrictions, the U.S. banking system
is composed of thousands of independently chartered banks. This contrasts sharply
with the highly concentrated banking systems of many European countries, Japan, and
Canada.5 For example, in 1990, the United States had 12,500 insured banks, while
Canada had only eight major banks.6
A. History of Bank Branching
Before the Civil War bank branching in this country was limited. Most banks
were state banks specifically chartered by state legislatures. Branching rights frequently
varied from bank to bank in accordance with a particular bank's charter, rather than
from state to state.7 The First and Second Banks of the United States, which were
headquartered in Philadelphia and combined commercial banking with some central
banking functions, operated branch offices throughout the country.
In 1836, after President Jackson's veto of legislation to recharter the Second
National Bank, the chartering of banks in the U.S. became exclusively a matter of state
law. Each state chartered its own banks and no state provided a general method for the
entry of banks chartered by other states. The primary concern during this period was
keeping local economies free of financial control by the monied interests in large cit-
ies. This led to the establishment of relatively small, locally-oriented banks.8 The rise
of "free banking" in the period immediately before the Civil War contributed to this
trend. Under "free banking" laws, no specific legislative charter was required. Rather,
anyone meeting specified, minimal statutory requirements (such as initial capitaliza-
tion) could obtain a charter. Free banks were for the most part chartered as "unit
banks"-that is they had no branches.9
In 1864, Congress passed the National Banking Act which established a national
banking system, and thus laid the foundation for today's dual banking system. From
this point forward, banks could choose to be either chartered as state banks and regu-
lated by state governments or chartered as national banks and regulated by the federal
government. Under the Act, national banks did not have the right to branch."
During the late 1880s, interest developed in permitting national banks branch as
a means of making banking services available to rural areas that could not support
separately incorporated banks. Owners of existing banks, however, were opposed to
this idea. Therefore, Congress, in the Currency Act of 1890, reduced the capital re-
quired to establish national banks from $50,000 to $25,000 for towns with populations
of less than 3,000. As a result, there was a rapid increase in the number of banks, from
13,000 in 1890 to 25,000 in 1910. This growth in the number of banks strengthened an
5. Comprehensive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991, SENATE
COMM. BANKING, HOUSING, & URB. AFF., S. REP. No. 167, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1991) [here-
inafter cited as S. REP. No. 167 (1991)].
6. Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks, REP.
DEP'T TREASURY, p. XVI1-16,17 (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter cited as REP. DEP'T TREASURY (1991)].
7. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994, SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING, & URB. AFF., S. REP. No. 240, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 240 (1994)].
8. Donald Savage, Interstate Banking Developments, 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 79 (1987).
9. S. REP. No. 240 (1994), supra note 7, at 5.
10. Department of the Treasury, Geographic Restrictions on Commercial Banking in the United
States: The Report of the President, at 5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S REP. (1981)].
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already powerful anti-branching lobby."
In the early 1900s, a number of states granted branching powers to their state-
chartered institutions, thus providing state banks a competitive advantage over national
banks operating in those markets. Some national banks began converting to state char-
ters in order to take advantage of the more favorable branching laws. In the early
1920s, the Comptroller of the Currency attempted to address this competitive imbal-
ance by allowing national banks to branch, but this action was struck down by the
Supreme Court in First National Bank in St. Louis v. State of Missouri. 2 The Court
held that the National Banking Act did not allow national banks to establish branch
offices. Congress acted to protect the national bank charter by passing the McFadden
Act in 1927. This Act authorized a national bank to open a limited number of branches
in its local community if the law of that state permitted banks chartered by such state
to do so.' 3
The collapse of the U.S. economy in the late 1920s and early 1930s caused ex-
tensive bank failures and revealed the weaknesses of unit banking. Consequently, many
states enacted legislation to permit their state-chartered banks to branch intrastate.
Congress responded in 1933 by amending the McFadden Act to permit national banks
to branch throughout their home state to the same extent that the state permitted its
own banks to branch. Hence, Congress assigned to state legislatures the power to con-
trol national bank branching.'
4
Even as amended in 1933, however, the McFadden Act did not permit national
banks and state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System to branch into
states in which they were not located, regardless of whether state banks were autho-
rized to do so.' Because the McFadden Act does not apply to state-chartered banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve System ... such banks were allowed to
establish interstate branch networks in a state if that state permitted such action. 6 At
present, interstate branching is severely limited. Alaska, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, and Rhode Island are the only states that allow interstate branching
by state banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. Furthermore, each
of these states' statutes require reciprocity by the state that headquarters the bank seek-
ing entry. 7
B. History of Interstate Banking
In order to avoid the branching restrictions imposed by federal and state govern-
ments, banks began to form bank holding companies in the 1940s and 1950s.' "The
holding company structure enabled a bank to obtain a rough equivalent to a branch
bank even when branch banking itself was impermissible. A holding company could
purchase banks in different localities both within and outside a state."' 9 Originally,
11. REP. DEP'T TREASURY (1991), supra note 6, at XVII-5.
12. 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
13. REP. DEP'T TREASURY (1991), supra note 6, at XVII-6.
14. JoAnn Nestor, Interstate Branch Banking Reform: Preserving the Policies Underlying the
McFadden Act, 72 B.U. L. REv. 607, 610 (1992).
15. S. REP. No. 240 (1994), supra note 7, at 5.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. id. at 6.
19. Id.
Journal of Legislation
most holding companies were created in an effort to expand geographically in what
were otherwise unit banking states.
1. The Douglas Amendment
The bank holding company structure did not impart all the efficiencies of branch
banking, but it did allow banks to expand the geographic scope of their operations."
This so-called loophole around interstate banking restrictions was partially closed by
the Douglas Amendment of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.2" The Douglas
Amendment applied the principles of the McFadden Act to the bank holding company
structure. It prohibited the interstate acquisition of a bank by a bank holding company
unless explicitly authorized by a statute of the state where the bank to be acquired was
located.22
lation to allow, beginning in 1978, out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire
Maine banks. The legislation was motivated in large measure by Maine's desire to
attract new investment capital.23 The law initially required reciprocity. In other words,
bank holding companies headquartered in another state, New York for example, could
acquire Maine banks only if bank holding companies headquartered in Maine were
allowed to acquire New York banks. Because of the reciprocity requirement no acqui-
sitions of Maine banks were possible until other states enacted statutes allowing the
acquisition of their banks by Maine bank holding companies.24
Other interstate banking statutes were enacted in the early 1980s, with Alaska,
Massachusetts, and New York passing laws that became effective in 1982. In general,
state statutes allowing out-of-state bank holding companies to acquire banks within a
state imposed two types of restrictions on out-of-state bank holding compa-
nies--regional restrictions and reciprocity restrictions. Reciprocity restrictions are
described above. Regional restrictions required the acquiring bank to be located within
the same region of the country as the bank to be acquired.' Many states enacted laws
imposing both types of restrictions on out-of-state institutions.
2. Regional Compacts
In 1982, Massachusetts started the movement toward regional interstate banking
arrangements by passing
a law permitting a bank holding company whose principal place of business was
located in Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or Vermont to
acquire a bank or a bank holding company in Massachusetts. The law, however,
permitted such acquisitions only if the state in which the acquiring bank was locat-
ed expressly authorized similar acquisitions by a Massachusetts holding company
under conditions no more restrictive than those imposed by the Massachusetts
law.26
20. Id.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1994).
22. Nestor, supra note 14, at 619.
23. Donald Savage, Interstate Banking: A Status Report, 79 FED. RESERVE BULL. 1075 (1993).
24. S. REP. No. 240 (1994), supra note 7, at 6.
25. Id.
26. Nestor, supra note 14.
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Connecticut followed the Massachusetts lead and enacted a similar law in 1983.27
The regional compact created by Massachusetts and Connecticut was challenged
in the courts because it did not provide equal entry rights for banks headquartered in
all states. The challenge was based on the grounds that the Douglas Amendment did
not authorize regional compacts and that by discriminating against non-New England
banks the compact violated the Commerce and Equal Protection clauses of the Consti-
tution. The United States Supreme Court upheld the regional laws in June 1985 in
Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2' The Court
stated that the legislative history of the Douglas Amendment, including its strong anal-
ogy to the McFadden Act, led to "no other conclusion but that Congress contemplated
that some states might partially lift the ban on interstate banking without opening
themselves up to interstate banking from everywhere in the Nation."29 Based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Northeast Bancorp, many states have enacted some form
of interstate banking legislation. Today, a majority of states allow for full, nationwide
interstate banking, but many states continue to impose restrictions on acquisitions. At
present, 34 states permit nationwide interstate banking, 15 states and the District of
Columbia permit interstate banking acquisitions on a regional basis, and only one state,
Hawaii, permits no interstate banking.3"
III. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE GEOGRAPHIC
RESTRICTIONS ON BANKING AND BRANCHING IN THE U.S.
A. Congress Commissions a Presidential Report
After enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act in 1956, Congress took no
action on interstate banking and branching for two decades. However, in the late
1970s, American banks complained that foreign banks operating in the U.S. had a
competitive advantage. Foreign banks were not restricted by the McFadden Act, and
thus were able to establish interstate branch networks. In 1978, Congress passed the
International Banking Act which, among other things, restricted foreign bank branching
privileges and for the first time established federal rules to govern foreign bank opera-
tions in the United States. This Act established a national treatment standard to create
a level playing field for domestic and foreign banks.3
In that 1978 Act, Congress also asked the President to submit a report on the
applicability of U.S. banking laws to current banking conditions. The report, delivered
to Congress during the closing days of the Carter Administration in January 1981,
examined the impact of both the McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment on U.S.
27. Nestor, supra note 14, at 622.
28. 472 U.S. 159 (1985).
29. Id. at 172.
30. S. REP. No. 240 (1994), supra note 7, at 6-7.
31. Fair Trade in Financial Services Act of 1994, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, &
URB. AFF., S. REP. No. 235, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994). Prior to the enactment of the Interna-
tional Banking Act of 1978, individual states regulated foreign bank operations. Congress further
strengthened the Federal Government's control over foreign bank operations in 1991 when it passed the
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act as Title II, Subtitle A of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 STAT. 2236 (1991) (codified as
amended in 12 U.S.C. (1994)).
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banks.3 2 It concluded that the geographic restrictions imposed by these laws were in-
creasingly "ineffective, inequitable, inefficient, and anachronistic" and recommended
that "interstate banking be ratified and further liberalized through a phased relaxation
of current geographic restraints."33
B. The Report Is Not Acted On
In its initial years, the Reagan Administration emphasized bank product liberal-
ization rather than geographic diversification, and the only action Congress took in the
early 1980s on interstate banking and branching was to allow the emergency interstate
acquisition of large failing institutions in an attempt to minimize the cost of bank
failures.34 In 1985, the House Banking Committee held hearings to examine com-
plaints about the inequities of regional compacts. Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board Paul Volcker testified that Congress should establish a federal limit on the num-
ber of years that states could maintain a system of regional interstate banking before
allowing states from the rest of the nation to take part.35 In addition, he recommended
that Congress establish safeguards to prevent the risk of excessive concentration of the
banking industry. One such safeguard was to limit the acquisitions of the largest bank-
ing institutions, such as prohibiting any of the largest 25 bank holding companies from
merging with one another. The other safeguard he proposed was to encourage states to
set limits on the proportion of banking assets within their borders that could be ac-
quired by out-of-state institutions of significant size. 6
Later that year, the House Banking Committee reported a bill incorporating most
of the Federal Reserve Board's recommendations, but it was not taken up by the
House of Representatives. 7 Moreover, the Senate took no action during this period.
Congress appeared content to leave liberalization of interstate banking to the states,
particularly after the Supreme Court's decision in Northeast Bancorp upholding region-
al compacts.
C. Growing Concerns About the Competitiveness of U.S. Banks
In January 1989, Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr. [D-MI] became Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in the midst of the massive
crisis afflicting the country's savings and loan industry. On February 9, 1989, President
Bush called on Congress, in a nationally televised statement on the crisis, to deliver a
package to reform the regulation of the savings and loan industry and its deposit insur-
ance fund within 45 days. 8 The Senate and House Banking Committees worked vir-
32. PRESIDENT'S REP. (1981), supra note 10, at Preface.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 STAT. 1469
(1982).
35. Savage, supra note 8, at 90-91.
36. Interstate Banking: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions Supervision, Reg., &
Ins. of the House Comm. on Banking, Fin., & Urb. Aff., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1985) (statement of
Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). The concept of
limits to prevent the excessive concentration of the banking industry was incorporated by Chairman
Riegle in the interstate banking and branching provisions of S. 543 and S. 1963 discussed later in this
paper.
37. Savage, supra note 8, at 90-91.
38. Deposit Insurance Reform and Financial Modernization: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, & Urb. Aff., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. pt. II, at 18 (1990), [hereinafter cited as Fi-
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tually non-stop on the issue and presented the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) to the President to sign in August 1989.' 9
Despite the savings and loan crisis and the intensity with which the Senate Bank-
ing Committee worked to resolve it, Chairman Riegle took time on July 11, 1989, to
hold the first of over 40 hearings during his six year tenure as Chairman on the com-
petitiveness of the U.S. in today's global economy. Senator Riegle's home state of
Michigan was devastated during the 1970s and 1980s by the automobile industry's loss
of market share to foreign imports. He was thus acutely aware of the competitive
challenges the increasing globalization of international markets posed for the American
economy. In his opening statement at the July 11 hearing, the Chairman expressed his
concerns:
There is no issue that is more important to this Senator than the competitiveness of
all sectors of our economy in today's global environment. This topic will be a
dominant theme of the period of time of my chairmanship and it is my intention to
hold a comprehensive series of hearings on these issues .... Over the years I have
become increasingly concerned... about the ability of the United States to com-
pete effectively in the international marketplace. This has serious ramifications not
only for our standard of living, but clearly for our national defense and long term
economic and military security.'
As a result of these concerns, Congress included a provision in FIRREA direct-
ing the Secretary of the Treasury to review the U.S. financial system and submit a
comprehensive reform proposal by February 1991." Chairman Riegle, in order to pre-
pare the Senate Banking Committee to deal with the major reform proposals it would
be receiving in 1991, scheduled a series of 13 hearings to examine options for federal
deposit insurance reform, as well as broader financial modernization measures to make
U.S. banks more competitive. At the hearings, numerous industry and government
representatives expressed serious concerns about the competitive decline of our finan-
cial institutions. The Chief Executive Officer of Chase Manhattan Bank, speaking on
behalf of the American Bankers Association (ABA), told the Committee that our banks
were losing their competitive edge in international financial markets, and that this
would reduce the competitiveness and market share of other U.S. industries, especially
export-related industries.42 Gerald Corrigan, the President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, testified that American banks were in competitive decline which
threatened the leadership position of the United States in world financial markets. He
listed several factors causing the decline, among them "an outdated legal institutional
framework" including the McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank
nancial Modernization Hearings (1990)].
39. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 STAT. 183, 507 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. (1989)).
40. Oversight Hearings on the Condition of U.S. Financial and Industrial Base: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urb. Aff., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1989). Senator John
Heinz [R-PA], the number two Republican on the Committee, shared Chairman Riegle's concerns. He
noted that other foreign governments had consciously adopted strategies to ensure the competitiveness
of their key industries.
41. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §
1001, 103 STAT. 183, 507-08 (1989).
42. Financial Modernization Hearings (1990), supra note 38, pt. I, at 63.
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Holding Company Act.43 In addition, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Alan
Greenspan" and FDIC Chairman William Seidman strongly recommended removing
the restrictions on interstate banking and branching as a means of strengthening the
competitiveness of U.S. banks.45
In June 1990, several representatives of foreign financial institutions also testi-
fied, including top officials from Germany's Deutsche Bank, England's Barclays Bank,
and Japan's Fuji Bank. The European official informed Committee members that the
European Community's Second Banking Coordination directive, adopted as part of a
series of measures to strengthen the competitiveness of European economies, would let
European banks branch across the European continent.' Every witness told the Com-
mittee that American banks were handicapped by domestic geographic restrictions
which prevented them from building a strong home base for their international opera-
tions.4' These witnesses also told the Committee that geographic restraints made U.S.
banks less stable because they could not diversify their loan portfolios across regions
and industrial sectors.' Later that summer, Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady
testified before the Committee and expressed similar views to those of the other wit-
nesses. He went even further, however, to point out that the European Communities'
decision to provide universal banking powers on a continent-wide basis would greatly
improve the competitiveness of European banks.49 and, therefore, could handicap the
competitiveness of U.S. banks if geographic restrictions on interstate banking and
branching in this country were not eliminated."
D. Failed Attempt in 1991
On February 5, 1991, the Administration submitted its report "Modernizing the
Financial System" to the Congress which recommended fundamental reforms to ensure
a safer, more competitive banking system, including legislative changes to the
McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment of the Bank Holding Company Act that
would permit nationwide banking and branching. The Report also called for repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act-which separates traditional commercial banking from invest-
ment banking-and prohibits commercial affiliations with banking organizations.5
43. Id. pt. II, at 37-38.
44. Id. pt. III, at 29.
45. Id. pt. III, at 332.
46. Id. pt. II, at 1002. Cumulatively, the series of steps taken by the European Community to
strengthen its competitiveness was known as EC-92. The Second Banking Coordination directive per-
mits banks to carry out activities authorized in their home countries throughout the community if such
activities are authorized in the directive's annex. 1990 O.J. (L32) 1-13.
47. See Financial Modernization Hearings (1990), supra note 38.
48. Id. pt. I1, at 717.
49. Id. pt. 111, at 263. Secretary Nicholas Brady used the term "universal banking" to mean that
many European banks could engage in commercial and investment banking activities in the same insti-
tution. The term "universal banking" is more commonly used to describe the financial activities of
German banks which engage in taking deposits, lending, underwriting and dealing in government and
corporate debt and equity investments, investment advising, management consulting and real estate
brokerage and investment activities. Id. pt. III, at 284.
50. Id. pt. III, at 332.
51. Id. The Glass-Steagall provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994), are
named after its sponsors, Senator Glass and Congressman Steagall. The provisions separate commercial
banking from investment banking because Congress believed in 1933 that commercial banks involved
in securities activities channeled bank funds into risk securities investments. Sections 12, 20, 21 and
32 of the Act are collectively known as the Glass-Steagall Act. For a more complete discussion of the
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The report noted that U.S. banks were losing market share at home to foreign banks
and other financial institutions as well as abroad to foreign banks. It noted:
As recently as 1983, three U.S. commercial banks were among the world's top
twenty in asset size; by year-end 1988 no U.S. bank was ranked among the world's
top twenty. In addition of the world's top 50 banks in market capitalization in
1988, only two were U.S. banks. 2
President Bush emphasized the importance of financial reform in his State of the
Union Address53 and in his letter to Congress transmitting his 1991 Economic Report.
In that letter, he wrote that "lifting restrictions on interstate banking activities and on
the ability of banks to combine with commercial and other financial firms will increase
banks' competitiveness."54
On March 5, 1991, Chairman Riegle introduced a bill-S. 543, the Comprehen-
sive Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991-to reform the
deposit insurance system. The Committee held numerous hearings on both the
Administration's proposal and S. 543. Chairman Riegle's bill as introduced did not
contain any provisions on interstate banking and branching. However, after a March
20, 1991, hearing on the Administration's interstate banking and branching proposals,
Chairman Riegle worked with Senator Dodd [D-CT] and other interested Committee
members to develop acceptable provisions. The Administration's interstate banking and
branching proposal did not have wide support on the Committee because it failed to
address concerns about concentration and did not provide an adequate role for states in
controlling branching of out-of-state banks. In addition, it did not provide states with
the ability to "opt-out" of interstate branching, a concept which was introduced by
Senator Dodd in his 1990 interstate banking bill, S. 2922." The Committee began
marking up S. 543 as modified by the Chairman and other fellow senators on July 31,
1991.56 Committee members considered this comprehensive legislation for three days.
On August 2, 1991, the Senate Banking Committee reported out S. 543 as amended
during the three-day markup by a vote of 12 to 9. For the first time, the Committee
had reported legislation to remove the restrictions on interstate banking and branching.
The bill permitted, among other things, bank holding companies that are adequately
capitalized and managed to: (1) after one year acquire existing banks in any state,
subject to concentration limits; (2) after two years establish subsidiary banks in any
state; and, (3) after three years convert subsidiaries into branches of the main bank, or
establish de novo branches, unless a state passed legislation to opt-out of interstate
background of these provisions and an explanation of the Bush Administration's effort to repeal it, see
REP. DEP'T TREASURY (1991), supra note 6, at xviii. In August of 1991, the Senate Banking Com-
mittee debated S. 543 which then contained provisions to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act. Those provi-
sions, however, were deleted before the bill was taken up by the full Senate in November of 1991.
See S. Rep. No. 167 (1991), supra note 5, at 147.
52. REP. DEP'T TREASURY (1991), supra note 6, at 7-8.
53. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 27 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DoC. 92 (Jan. 29, 1991).
54. President's Message to Congress Transmitting 1991 Economic Report, 27 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 163 (Feb. 12, 1991).
55. S. 2922, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990).
56. A mark-up is when members of a Committee meet, at the invitation of the Chairman, to
consider and amend bills he or she presents to them. When a bill has been marked up, it is reported
by the Committee. Committee staff then writes a report which accompanies the bill and is filed prior




During November 1991, the Senate debated the interstate banking and branching
provisions of S. 543, and on November 14 adopted an amendment offered by Senator
Ford [D-KY] to modify the provisions reported by the Banking Committee.58 On No-
vember 21, 1991, the Senate passed S. 543 by voice vote and became the first body of
Congress to remove the geographic restraints on interstate banking and branching.59
No such provisions were contained in the reform bill passed by the House. A confer-
ence committee, impaneled to reconcile differences in the respective House and Senate
bills, failed to include the-interstate branching provisions found in the Senate version.
Chairman Riegle later revealed that Congressman Dingell [D-MI], the Chairman of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, wanted to impose new restrictions on banks'
securities powers as a quid pro quo for accepting the interstate banking and branching
provisions. Secretary of the Treasury Brady refused to agree to this and, therefore, the
interstate banking and branching provisions were not included in the legislation ap-
proved by conferees.'
In 1992, Senators Dodd [D-CT], Sanford [D-NC], Kerry [D-MA], D'Amato [R-
NY], and Gain [R-UT] introduced S. 2207, an interstate banking and branching bill
very similar to that passed by the Senate in 1991. A similar bill, H.R.4170, was intro-
duced in the House in 1992 by Congressmen Vento [D-MN] and Wylie [R-OH]. How-
ever, no action was taken on these bills because it was a Presidential election year, a
time when members do not want to take up controversial legislation.6'
E. Action in the 103d Congress
On February 16, 1993, Senator Dodd introduced S. 371, a bill to permit interstate
banking that was fashioned on the provisions of S. 543 as reported by the Senate
Banking Committee in 1991.62 Two months later, on April 22, Senator Ford intro-
duced S. 810, an interstate banking bill that was similar to the interstate banking and
branching bill passed by the Senate in 1991.63 Both bills permitted: (1) bank holding
companies to turn existing subsidiary banks into branches of the main bank; (2) banks
to branch interstate by purchasing and converting banks into branches of the main
bank; and, (3) banks to opt-out of interstate branching. The principle difference be-
tween the two bills involved de novo interstate branching. Under the Ford bill, a state
had to pass a statute authorizing de novo interstate branching, while Dodd's bill did
57. S. REP. No. 167 (1991), supra note 5, at 61. The version of S. 543 marked up by the Com-
mittee amended both the McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company
Act.
58. S. REP. No. 240 (1994), supra note 7, at 3. Senator Ford's amendment, among other things,
eliminated the provisions for de novo branching and also modified the Committee's proposed treatment
of branches of foreign banks.
59. 137 CONG. REc. S17384-85 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1991).
60. Transcript of Mark Up on S. 1S27, The Fair Trade in Financial Services Act of 1993, Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urb. Aff., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1993) [hereinafter cited as Tran-
script (1993)]. Chairman Dingell, although a conferee on other portions of the conference to reconcile
S. 543 and H.R. 3768, was not a conferee on the interstate banking and branching provisions. Due to
his forceful personality, other House conferees and Speaker Foley [D-WAI were reluctant to cross him
on matters of importance to him. Congressman Dingell refused to accept interstate banking and branch-
ing without a deal to restrict banks' abilities to sell securities.
61. See generally Financial Modernization Hearings (1990), supra note 38.
62. 139 CONG. REc. S1612 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
63. 139 CONG. REc. S4832 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1993) (statement of Sen. Ford).
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not require any state action-de novo interstate branching was deemed permissible.
Bankers favored the Ford version as it enhanced the franchise value of existing banks.
The Committee held hearings on October 5 and November 3, 1993, on Title III
of S. 543, the interstate banking and branching provisions passed by the Senate in
1991. Witnesses were also invited to testify concerning Section 704 of S. 543, the
provision that dealt with the insurance activities of national banks.'M At the October
hearing, the representative of the American Bankers Association (ABA) declared sup-
port for the interstate banking provisions passed by the Senate in 1991, but expressed
strong opposition to any effort to restrict the sale of insurance by banks. Furthermore,
the ABA threatened to block passage of an interstate banking and branching bill that
restricted bank insurance powers.65
In an October 25, 1993, speech outlining the Clinton Administration's banking
agenda, Secretary of the Treasury Bentsen called on Congress to remove the geograph-
ic restrictions to interstate banking and branching. He stated, "We currently have a de
facto system of interstate banking, but it's a patchwork system, and it's clumsy."
Under Secretary of the Treasury Frank Newman, at the Committee's November 3
hearing, announced support generally for the principles of the interstate banking and
branching provisions passed by the Senate in 1991."
F. Insurance Amendment Delays Markup
Chairman Riegle scheduled a markup for November 18, 1993, on a Committee
Print embodying the interstate banking and branching provisions of S. 543. Prior to the
markup, Senator Dodd filed an amendment to restrict the insurance activities of banks.
His amendment closely resembled Section 704 of S. 543 as passed by the Senate in
1991. The banks lobbied against the amendment. Many members of the Committee did
not want to have to vote on the issue. As a result, a quorum could not be established
and the Committee could not proceed with the markup. Senator Dodd declared that he
64. Letter from Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr. to Under Secretary of the Treasury Frank Newman
(Sep. 23, 1993) (invitation to testify). Section 92 of the National Bank Act, enacted in 1916, authoriz-
es a national bank located in a town with a population of 5,000 or less to sell insurance, subject to
the regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency. While the legislative history of this provision is
not extensive, it apparently was intended to promote availability of banking services in rural areas by
allowing small-town banks to sell insurance, thereby enhancing the financial viability of such banks.
In 1986, the Comptroller interpreted this provision to permit a national bank or branch in a
town of 5,000 to sell insurance nationwide. Some states have prohibited banks and bank affiliates from
selling insurance. The Comptroller's 1986 action, however, preempted such state laws.
In 1991, the Senate passed legislation overturning the Comptroller's 1986 decision. Section 704
of S. 543 passed by the Senate on November 21, 1991, would have repealed the town of 5,000 provi-
sion altogether. It would have allowed a national bank in a town of 5,000 or less to sell insurance
only to individuals living and working in, and businesses located in, the town and contiguous rural
areas within 7.5 miles. Neither Section 704, nor similar measures passed by Committees of the House
of Representatives, were included in the banking legislation passed by Congress in 1991.
In July 1993, in Independent Insurance Agents v. Ludwig, 997 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the Comptroller's interpretation of Section 92.
This vastly strengthened the bargaining leverage of the banks on insurance issues. They would no
longer accept the language they agreed to in Section 704 of the 1991 bill that passed the Senate.
65. Interstate Banking and Insurance Activities of National Banks: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urb. Aff., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1993), [hereinafter cited as Inter-
state Banking Hearings (1993)].
66. Address by Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bentsen, Center for National Priorities (Oct. 25,
1993).
67. Interstate Banking Hearings (1993), supra note 65, at 152.
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would not let an interstate banking bill be reported out of Committee without a vote on
his amendment."
On February 3, 1994, the House Banking Committee's Subcommittee on Finan-
cial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Insurance approved interstate
banking and branching legislation by a unanimous vote of 29-0. Movement on inter-
state banking and branching seemed stalled in the Senate when, that afternoon, Senator
Dodd went to the Senate floor to make a major announcement on the subject. He told
the Senate:
I have been for years concerned about the sale of insurance products by our
nation's banks. Over the past two years banks have dramatically expanded their
insurance sales activities. This has occurred not as a result of sound policy choices
by Congress, but rather as a result of creative legal interpretations by federal bank
regulatory agencies. .. For several months I have been working with a number of
banks, insurance agents groups and insurance companies to craft a reasonable
amendment to deal with this matter.69
Senator Dodd then announced any such amendment did not have the "horsepower" to
move beyond the Committee. He said, "I do not want to compromise interstate legisla-
tion by linking these two issues, which I think would defeat or severely slow down
the... legislation." He went on to announce that he would not offer an insurance
amendment during any Committee mark up of interstate legislation."
G. With Insurance Issue Removed, the Path Clears
Following this announcement, the Committee held a markup on the Chairman's
Committee Print on February 23, 1993. Senator D'Amato [R-NY], the ranking Repub-
lican on the Banking Committee, urged his colleagues to support the Riegle Committee
Print "because it is the first step toward making the U.S. a more competitive force in
the global financial services marketplace."'" At the markup, Senator Gramm [R-TX]
told Chairman Riegle, "It's a very good bill. I hope it becomes law. I think it will be
part of your legacy as Chairman."72 It was reported out of the Committee by a vote
of 19-0 and was then introduced as an original bill, S. 1963, by Chairman Riegle on
March 23, 1994. The House passed an interstate banking and branching bill, H.R.
3841, on March 22, 1994."
Majority Leader Mitchell granted the Senate Banking Committee floor time to
take up S. 1963 on April 25, 1994. When Chairman Riegle presented the bill to the
full Senate that day he told Senators:
The restrictions on interstate branching are an American anomaly. The United
States is the only industrial country that restricts bank branching. The globalization
of the U.S. banking industry means that U.S. banks cannot afford to continue to
base their success on a limited geographical area. They cannot match their competi-
tors while burdened with costly subsidiary structures and cannot be strong global
68. Transcript (1993), supra note 60, at 13-20.
69. 140 CONG. REC. S758-59 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
70. Id. at S758.
71. Transcript of Mark Up on S. 1963, The Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994, Sen-
ate Comm. Banking, Housing, & Urb. Aff., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1994).
72. Id. at 19.
73. 140 CONG. REC. H1851 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1994).
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competitors without larger deposit bases in this country. Removing the restrictions
on bank branching will permit American banks to become strong global competi-
tors with an enhanced capacity to help U.S. companies sell their goods in markets
abroad. 4
Senator Murkowski [R-AK], who was not a member of the Banking Committee, took
the floor to announce his support for S. 1963, noting it would help our banks compete
with their international counterparts." Senator Ford, who was also not a member of
the Banking Committee, claimed that the interstate bill passed by the House gave
foreign banks competitive advantages and urged Senate Conferees to rectify that in
Conference.76 On April 26, after the Senate passed S. 1963 by voice vote, it took up
H.R.3841, stripped it of all but its enacting clause, substituted the text of S. 1963, and
sent it to the House asking for a conference to reconcile the differing provisions.77
H. A New Obstacle to Passage
Conferees from the two bodies did not meet for three months as House and
Senate staff worked to resolve most of the more than 40 differences between the
House and Senate bills, many of which were both complex and technical. On July 25,
1994, Conferees met and quickly accepted the staff recommended resolutions.78 They
then spent a considerable amount of time discussing an item that had not been present
in either bill. This was the so-called homestead provision brought in to the Conference
by Congressman Gonzalez [D-TXJ, the Chairman of the House Banking Committee.
After passage of the House interstate bill in March, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit upheld a regulation issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision that pre-
empted a provision of the Texas Constitution protecting homesteads of Texas borrow-
ers from foreclosure on loans using the homestead as collateral unless such loans were
made for the purpose of purchasing or improving the property.79
Chairman Gonzalez, being from Texas, was unhappy that the Fifth Circuit upheld
the preemption of the Texas Constitution by a federal regulation. He was determined to
use the interstate bill as a means of overturning the court decision, and made it clear
there would be no bill if he was not satisfied on this point. On the other hand, his
Texas colleague Senator Gramm argued against Senate acceptance of the Gonzalez
proposal, and when outvoted told the conferees he would raise a point of order against
the Conference Report on the basis it violated Rule XXVIII(2) of the Standing Rules
of the Senate which bars conferees from inserting in Conference Reports matters not
passed by either body. Chairman Riegle argued that the homestead provision was a
consumer protection amendment and was, therefore, relevant to other consumer protec-
tion provisions in the bill. He asserted his belief that the Senate Parliamentarian would
rule against Senator Gramm's point of order.80
74. 140 CONG. REC. S4765 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1994) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
75. 140 CONG. REC. S4801 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1994) (statement of Sen. Murkowski).
76. 140 CONG. REc. S4812 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1994) (statement of Sen. Ford). Sen. Ford [D-KY]
introduced into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD letters from over 15 state banking associations complain-
ing about competitive advantages enjoyed by foreign banks in this country.
77. 140 CONG. REc. S4821 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1994).
78. Conference Report on Riegle-Neal Banking Efficiency Act, H.R. No. 651, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 47 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068.
79. Id. at 57-58.
80. His belief was based on a passage (Floyd M. Riddick, SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND
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As Conferees were completing their work, Senator Sarbanes [D-MD] saluted
Chairman Riegle, who was retiring from the Senate, for his outstanding six year ser-
vice as Banking Committee Chairman. He moved that "the very important and signifi-
cant piece of legislation" be named after Senator Riegle." House Conferees agreed
and asked that it also be named after Congressman Neal [D-NC], the Chairman of the
House Banking Committee's Financial Institutions Subcommittee who had done so
much to move the bill through the House. Conferees then approved the Conference
Report and it was filed on August 2, 1994.82 Two days later the full House consid-
ered and passed the Conference Report.83 The Senate was occupied debating President
Clinton's health care plan and took its summer recess without acting on the report.
Concerns were raised that when the Senate returned in September it would make
an effort to salvage President Clinton's health care reform proposals and the interstate
bill would not be given floor time if it looked as if there would be a long floor fight
over its passage. Various Senators and institutions interested in the passage of the final
bill furiously lobbied Senator Gramm to refrain from filibustering and/or raising a
point of order against the Conference Report. Despite Senator Gramm's stated opposi-
tion, the Senate Majority Leader scheduled the Conference Report for consideration by
the full Senate on September 13, 1994. Senator Gramm refrained from making his
point of order and the Conference Report quickly passed the Senate by a vote of 94-
484
President Clinton signed the bill into law on September 29, 1995. Speaking at
the ceremony, Thomas LaBreque, the Chief Executive Officer of Chase Manhattan
Bank, said passage of the bill "demonstrated a national commitment to making the
United States efficient and globally competitive." He told the assembled leaders that,
"This law will change that and enable global banks such as Chase to compete more
successfully around the world as well."" President Clinton agreed and in signing the
bill said it fit into his Administration's comprehensive economic strategy to make the
country more competitive."
Three weeks later as Chairman Riegle's 18-year Senate career was being com-
pleted, Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown wrote to him and said:
I am writing to salute you for the truly outstanding work you have done as Chair-
man of the Banking Committee over the last six years... Among the most impor-
tant of your legislative achievements were the provisions of the Export Enhance-
ment Act of 1992 requiring the Executive Branch to formulate a competitiveness
strategy for our nation and an export promotion strategy. The Riegle-Neal Interstate
PRACnCES 484 (1981)), which provides that a point of order made under Rule XXVIII(2) will be sus-
tained if the new matter is "entirely irrelevant" to the subject matter of the bill. Chairman Riegle had
his staff filed a brief with the Senate Parliamentarian explaining the relevancy of the homestead provi-
sion to other consumer protection provisions in both the Senate and House passed interstate banking
and branching bills.
81. Id. at 44.
82. Id. at title page. In an attempt to show sympathy for Sen. Gramm's objection to the inclusion
of the homestead provision in the Conference Report, Senate Banking Committee Republicans refused
to sign the Conference Report.
83. 140 CONG. REC. H6774 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994).
84. 140 CONG. REC. S12765-68 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994).
85. President Bill Clinton Signs Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, FEDER-
AL NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
86. Id.
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Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 will also strengthen our banking
system's ability to help U.S. exporters. Your Committee's bipartisan work on this
matter has served our nation well and has helped us prepare to meet the global
economic challenges of the 21st century."
Making U.S. banks and the American economy more competitive was not the
only reason Congress passed the Riegle-Neal bill. Congress also believed the legisla-
tion would promote diversification of banks' assets and loan portfolios and help banks
survive downturns in local economies. This, it was believed, would also help safeguard
the taxpayer-backed Bank Insurance Fund.88 Congress also believed the bill would
lead to greater customer convenience and enhance choices for consumers. But it is the
contention of the authors of this article that a key moving force behind the bill was the
conviction that America had to end the geographic restrictions on its banking system to
enhance the competitiveness of our banks and economy in general. The authors also
believe that resolving this issue will make it easier to deal with product liberalization
issues that have also been cited by many as another aspect of strengthening the com-
petitiveness of U.S. banks and our banking system.
IV. MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE RIEGLE-NEAL BILL
A. Interstate Banking
Section 101 amends Section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act to provide
that one year after its enactment (September 30, 1995) a bank holding company, that is
adequately capitalized and managed may acquire banks in any state. Unlike Section
102 which governs interstate branching, Section 101 does not allow any state to opt-
out of interstate banking. It does preserve state laws which require an acquiring com-
pany to purchase a bank that has been in existence for a specified period of time (not
to exceed five years). States, however, may not discriminate among out-of-state buyers.
Interstate expansion by bank holding companies is subject to concentration limits.
The Federal Reserve Board is prohibited from approving an interstate acquisition that
would result in the holding company controlling more than 30 percent of the deposits
held by insured depository institutions in a particular state, unless the host state elimi-
nates the limitations entirely or has a lower concentration restriction. The Federal
Reserve would also be prohibited from approving an acquisition if, as a result, the
bank holding company would control more than 10 percent of the total amount of
deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States.89 The concentration
limits would not apply to initial entry into a state by a bank holding company. The Act
also provides that the concentration limits do not supersede nondiscriminatory antitrust
laws, which will continue to govern banking mergers and consolidations as before.
87. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown to Chairman Riegle (Oct. 21, 1994).
88. Congress created the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) in Section 211 of the Financial Institutions
Reform Recovery Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 STAT. 183, 218 (1989). The BIF is adminis-
tered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and is the successor of the FDIC's previ-
ous insurance fund. Section 226 also created the Savings Association Fund Advisory Committee, which
is also administered by the FDIC to insure deposits at savings and loan chartered institutions.
89. There is plenty of room for consolidation before any bank will run into this limitation on
expansion by acquisition. BankAmerica, which controls the most domestic deposits has less than 4.5%
of the total. Paul Simoff, Branching Law Can Pan out as a Bonanza for Small Banks, AMERiCAN
BANKER, Oct. 26, 1994, at 8.
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Section 101 further provides that the Federal Reserve Board, in acting on any
application for an interstate acquisition under Section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act, should consider the applicant's record of compliance with the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977" and with state community reinvestment laws as well.
B. Interstate Branching
Section 102 of the bill permits interstate mergers and consolidations of existing
banks starting June 1, 1997. Thus, a bank in State A could merge with a bank in State
B and the bank in State B could be operated as a branch of the bank in State A. Simi-
larly, an existing network of bank holding company subsidiary banks could be consoli-
dated into branches of a single bank on that date. States can also opt-in to allowing
out-of-state banks to acquire branches from an existing bank, rather than purchase the
entire bank.
To be eligible to merge interstate each bank involved in the transaction must be
adequately capitalized and managed when the application is filed. Thus, a bank holding
company with some distressed subsidiaries must recapitalize them before they can be
merged. The resulting bank must also be adequately capitalized.
Concentration limits, the same as those for interstate banking, apply to branching
and consolidation as do any lower state deposit caps. The concentration limits, howev-
er, do not apply to any mergers of banks that are already affiliated. This would allow a
bank holding company to consolidate its existing network of subsidiary banks into one
bank with branches even when some of the existing subsidiaries have a market share
larger than the limits.
States can opt-out of the interstate merger/branching provisions by enacting a law
to that effect after the date of enactment (September 29, 1994) and before June 1,
1997. If a state opts-out of the branching provisions, its banks cannot participate in
interstate branching in any way. States can also opt-in and allow branching to take
place before June 1, 1997. Section 103 of the bill also allows states to opt-in to de
novo branching, that is to permit a bank to open an out-of-state branch without merg-
ing with an existing institution or acquiring an existing branch. A bank that opens a
new branch in a state that opts-in will be subject to all the same conditions that apply
to branching by acquisition.
One of the most contentious issues faced by the Senate and House conferees
concerned what powers host states would have over the newly-established branches of
a national bank headquartered in another state. The Senate bill provided that branches
of national banks would be subject to the host state laws as if they were branches of
national banks having their main office in the state. The House bill, however, provided
that any branch of an out-of-state national bank would be subject to state law with
respect to interstate branching, consumer protection, fair lending and community rein-
vestment as if they were branches of a host state bank, except to the extent that such
state law was preempted by federal law on the same subject.
The manner by which these provisions were reconciled was of enormous impor-
tance to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the regulator of national
90. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the regulator of na-
tionally chartered banks, established a framework and criteria by which it would assess whether a bank
was meeting the credit needs of its community. New regulations, effective in 1995, specifically include
low and moderate income neighborhoods. 12 C.F.R. § 25 (1995).
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banks, and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS). The OCC wanted to
retain his authority to preempt, either by letter or regulation, state laws that interfered
with the safe and efficient operation of national banks. The CSBS wanted to ensure the
OCC could not lightly preempt state laws of major importance to states. The conferees
finally agreed that the laws of the host state regarding community reinvestment, con-
sumer protection (including applicable usury laws), fair lending, and establishment of
intrastate branches will apply to any branch of a national bank in the host state to the
same extent as such state laws apply to a branch of a bank chartered by that state,
except when Federal law preempts, or if the Comptroller determines that the state law
has a discriminating effect on the branch in comparison to branches of state chartered
banks.9
Section 105 of Riegle-Neal permits the appropriate bank supervisor of a host
state to examine branches of out-of-state banks to assure compliance with host state
laws, including those governing banking, community reinvestment, fair lending, con-
sumer protection and permissible activities, and to assure that the activities of the
branch are conducted in a safe and sound manner. State bank supervisors are permitted
to enter into cooperative agreements to facilitate supervision of state banks operating
interstate.
Section 107 of the bill attempts to meet the concerns that were expressed by
Senator Ford during Senate debate of S. 1963 concerning the competitive advantages
enjoyed by the wholesale direct branches of foreign banks. Section 107 provides that if
a foreign bank buys a U.S. bank and converts it into an uninsured branch of the for-
eign bank, the branch will continue to be subject to CRA requirements.92 The Section
also tightens regulations that govern the types of deposits of less than $100,000 that
may be gathered by uninsured branches of foreign banks and further provides that all
activities of such branches are subject to all consumer laws that apply to their domestic
bank competitors. In order to ensure that interstate branching does not allow major
banks through their branches to accumulate deposits from communities without making
loans, Section 109 requires each appropriate Federal banking agency to promulgate
regulations effective June 1, 1997, prohibiting interstate branches from being used as
deposit production offices. The regulations must require that if the percentage of loans
made by an out-of-state bank in the host state, relative to the deposits taken in the host
state, is less than half the average of such percentage for all host state banks, the ap-
propriate federal banking agency shall review its loan portfolio and determine if the
out-of-state bank is helping to meet the credit needs of the community it serves. If the
agency determines that it is not, it may order the branch to be closed. The provision
applies to new interstate branches of national banks, state banks and foreign banks
established pursuant to Title I of the bill.
Section 110 of the new law is also aimed at ensuring that banks with interstate
branches in several states continue to meet local credit needs in each state in which the
91. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 651, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 53-56 (1994). This report provides an impor-
tant statement of congressional intent with regard to the power of the Comptroller of the Currency to
preempt state law in this area. Also note that the conferees agreed that only the OCC would have the
authority to enforce state laws applicable branches of national banks.
92. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1824 (1994) was amended by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 STAT. 2236 (1991)
to forbid new branches of foreign banks from taking retail insured deposits. Thus, foreign banks want-
ing to operate a retail banking business must do so as a U.S. bank subsidiary.
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bank operates. The Section amends the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) to pro-
vide that an interstate institution receive a separate CRA rating for each state in which
it maintains branches.
V. CONCLUSION
The principle provisions of the Riegle-Neal bill governing interstate banking and
branching are set forth above. They were carefully crafted to take into consideration
the traditional fears in this country about concentrated financial power and to ensure
the larger institutions made possible by the bill's passage would continue to serve the
credit needs of local communities. They were also drafted to ensure state governments
would have a right to opt-out of iiterstate branching and if they do not opt-out to be
able to apply their laws to the out-of-state banks whose branches enter the State. This
was to meet concerns expressed by some that interstate branching could weaken the
role of state governments in guiding their state's economic development. Meeting such
concerns was part of the political process of developing a bill that could get through
the Senate and not be opposed by the numerous Senators from smaller states who
share the political concerns that have traditionally blocked consideration of interstate
banking and branching legislation.
Some commentators believe the new bill will in time strengthen the national
bank portion of our dual banking system at the expense of state banks. This is because
it will be easier for a bank to branch nationwide with a national bank charter and be
subject to just one set of regulators than to have to worry about many state regulators
governing its state branches as would an interstate branched state chartered bank. State
Bank Supervisors will, no doubt, enter into cooperative arrangements to facilitate state
supervision of state banks that branch interstate in order to compensate for the new
advantages that the bill gives to a national bank charter as the vehicle for interstate
banking.
The authors believe the new law will create a more consolidated banking system
as large bank holding companies consolidate their separately chartered banks into
branches of the parent bank. In doing so, they will generate substantial savings as they
consolidate management, legal services, data processing, compliance and other activi-
ties. In addition, the statute permits banks to purchase existing banks and convert them
into branches. Although the conversion provision may not be exercised until June 1,
1997-unless a state opts in earlier-banks wishing to position themselves for the en-
hanced competitive environment will likely be making strategic acquisitions over the
next two years.
The authors also expect that over time a few national "champion" banks with
international experience will emerge and become partners in assisting U.S. exporters
compete more effectively in global markets. This is essential to our country if we are
to shed our debtor national status. Such banks with branches throughout the country
will be better situated to assist small and medium-sized businesses break into the ex-
port market with their international expertise. They will have the knowledge to work
with institutions such as the newly created Federal Level Trade Promotion Committee
(TPCC). Their overseas branches and agencies working the U.S. embassies and the
foreign commercial service will help find export and investment opportunities and help
U.S. companies take advantage of them.93
93. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1010, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1992). The TPCC created by
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The number of banks in the country will probably shrink from 11,000 less than
half that number over the next several years. This will not mean the demise of the
community bank, for such banks will continue to play an essential role in local credit
markets. It must also be remembered that, even if a community bank is purchased by a
larger bank, new banking charters can be secured by those wishing to combine with
larger banks in local markets.
In signing the bill, President Clinton expressed the hope that its passage would
"mark the beginning of continued efforts to modernize banking laws outdated by tech-
nology."'94 This hope reflected the Administration's view that step-by-step reform of
our outdated laws governing financial services would stand a better chance of success
than the more comprehensive bill sought by the Bush Administration. The Bush Ad-
ministration proposal attempted to deal with, among other things, interstate banking,
Glass-Steagall reform, bank regulatory consolidation, and repeal of the Bank Holding
Company Act (the law which separates banking and commerce). Such a proposal creat-
ed too many opponents as securities firms, small banks, consumer groups, state bank
regulators, and others united to kill the legislation. An incremental approach, like that
taken with interstate banking, makes the most sense in the present political climate.
That is why many experts believe that the resolution of the interstate issue will allow
"financial modernization" to be addressed more directly than in past Congresses. It is
interesting to note that Congressman Jim Leach [R-IA], the new Chairman of the
House Banking Committee, introduced a bill to repeal Glass-Steagall on the first day
of the 104th Congress and announced that issue was his top priority.95 The Chairman
of the Senate Banking Committee has also introduced legislation to take on that and
other related issues.96
On March 1, 1995 Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin testified before the
House Committee on Banking and Financial Services on Chairman Leach's proposal to
repeal Glass-Steagall. The Secretary noted that most major foreign countries permit
banks to engage in both commercial and investment banking. Permitting banks to the
do the same, he testified, would enhance their competitiveness in the international
marketplace and expand the quality of financial services offered at home.97
This article has attempted to show that making U.S. banks and the American
economy more competitive was a principle consideration behind the formulation and
passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.
That same rationale supports the need to amend the Glass-Steagall Act so that com-
mercial and investment banking functions can be carried out in the same financial
institution.
Section 201 of Title II was enacted to develop a government-wide strategic plan to assist U.S. export-
ers. U.S. banks should play a major role in assisting the government to implement these provisions.
94. President Bill Clinton Signs Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, supra
note 2.
95. H.R. 18, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). According to a weekly report of the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors, Chairman Leach plans to begin marking up a revised Glass-Steagall bill (H.R.
1062, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)) on May 9, 1995.
96. S. 337, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
97. George Graham, Rubin Attacked on Banking Reform, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1995, at 6.
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